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Mistake of law in French criminal law
by Andrew Kirsch
i  n the new Criminal Code issued by the. French Parliament in 
1992 (which came into 
force in March 1994), a 
few novelties appeared 
among the provisions 
pertaining to the general 
principles governing 
criminal liability. One 
was a new defence
Andrew Kmch terme(} 'mistake of law'
It consists either in a lack of knowledge of legal provisions, or in 
their misinterpretation. It has become a ground which negatives 
criminal liability. According to art. 122-3:
'A person is not criminally liable where that person proves he [/she] 
believed an act could be carried out lawfully, because of a mistake of law 
which he [/she] was not in a position to avoid.'
Historically, in order to decide whether mistake of law could 
amount to a defence, Roman law distinguished offences against 
jus naturale, of which it was presumed no-one would be unaware. 
Otherwise, judges took into account the ignorance a person 
owed to his position: for example, the rusticus could enjoy 
diminished responsibility. Natural law later became widely 
influenced by Christian theology and a French medieval lawyer 
wrote that such precepts are 'engraved in the heart of every 
man'. On the other hand, however, it was accepted that some 
people   such as foreign travellers   could be forgiven for 
ignorance of minor rules.
In modern times foreign legislators have adopted diverse 
positions. The Norwegians, for example, accepted in their 1902 
Criminal Code (art. 57) that a reasonable mistake of law can 
negative liability. The Swiss (art. 20), German (art. 17, 1975) 
and Austrian (art. 9) Criminal Codes also provide that a 
reasonable mistake of law is ground for a mitigated penalty or 
even an exemption. Belgian law which, like the French, mainly 
originated in the Napoleonic codes and therefore also rejected 
such a defence, finally accepted it through judge-made law. 
Articles 5 and 47(2) of the Italian Criminal Code provide that if 
a mistake concerns a civil, rather than criminal, provision, it 
amounts to a lack of mens rea; English law is similar in this 
respect.
English law has a rather rigid attitude concerning this 
question. In the great majority of cases, whether the accused 
knew his act was against the law is irrelevant. 'Ignorance'of the 
law is no defence in crime,' said Lord Bridge (in Grant v Borg 
[1982] All ER 257 at 263, HL). An exception is provided where 
the accused made a mistake about the meaning of some legal 
concept used in the definition of the actus reus — but only if this 
concept belongs to civil and not criminal law (see, e.g. R v Smith 
[1974] 1 All ER 632, CA).
In France, this plea was completely abandoned at the time of 
the 1789 revolution. During the nineteenth century, Republican 
Law was regarded with great reverence; this is why an 
irrebuttable presumption of knowledge of the law was easily 
accepted by all lawyers. It was and still is expressed either in 
Latin (nemo censetur ignorare legem) or in French (nul n'est cense 
ignorer la lof): no-one is supposed to be unaware of the law.
None of the offences provided for in the 1810 Criminal Code 
could be committed without mens rea. A person who did not 
understand that he or she was infringing criminal provisionso o 1
should therefore not have been considered an offender. But this 
logical argument was led astray by the presumption of knowledge 
of the law.
This principle is not inscribed in any statutory provision but 
nevertheless governs the entirety of French law (in which case 
law is supposed to be secondary). In these days of over- 
regulation, it can no longer be considered as founded on any 
sociological reality. More and more offences have no link with 
any moral standards. Many theoretical explanations were 
suggested, but the presumption is actually nothing but a useful 
fiction, springing from practical considerations.
French courts have been implacable, repeatedly claiming that 
'pretending not to have known the criminal nature of the facts is 
not an excuse and has no influence on mens rea'. The 
presumption in itself is quite understandable; its irrebuttable 
nature is less so. Of course almost all offenders know that what 
they are doing is wrong. But what about those faced with 
insuperable obstacles to knowing about the legality of their 
actions? In some circumstances, such as war or natural disasters, 
communications are often cut off and it is impossible to know 
about any changes in the law. More often, the accused has sought 
information from qualified authorities such as, for example, the 
police, and acquired wrong information based on their mistaken 
belief. Should not the adage 'error communisfacit jus' then apply? 
Treating in the same way those who have genuinely tried to verify 
the legality of their acts and those who have been careless about 
this knowledge is inequitable and only encourages careless 
behaviour.
NEW DEFENCE
'A person is not criminally liable where that person proves he [/she] believed an 
act could be carried out lawfully, because of a mistake of law which he [/she] 
was not in a position to avoid.' (art. 122-3, French Criminal Code)
Of course a few limitations do exist. Many jurists have 
suggested other restrictions, depending on the nature of the law 
that was transgressed, the offender's circumstances, or else on 
the nature of the mistake. The latter was the basis of what was 
called the 'unavoidable mistake of law' theory (literally, in 
French, 'invincible mistake of law'). 25
Although it did not prove very successful before the courts, it 
would seem that this theory was officially approved by 
Parliament in the 1992 Criminal Code. One of the legislator's 
official aims, when issuing this new code, was to adapt the law to 
the evolution of French society. It is often said that modern 
societies are built on appearances. One must not mistake 
appearances for reality, but they sometimes seem so credible that 
one should not be considered at fault for relying on them. This 
idea is probably the basis of art. 122-3. The offender acted 
because he thought that the act which he was about to carry out 
was legal: his behaviour appeared lawful to him.
A mistake of law amounts to a lack of mem rea. This argument, 
which can now be brought to a conclusion, has nevertheless been 
confined within strict limits. Not just any mistake will do and, 
even where the mistake is found to be legally effective, its 
consequences are still unclear.
THE MISTAKE
Whether the mistake relates to civil or criminal law is 
irrelevant. Article 122-3 is aimed at mistakes of law in general 
and where the legislator drew no distinction, nor should the 
judge. What is of the utmost importance is the origin of the 
mistake and its precise effect on the mind of the accused.
ORIGIN OF THE MISTAKE
Article 122-3 does not contain any provision relating to the 
origin of the 'insuperable' mistake made by the accused. 
Logically, the unavoidable nature of the mistake should mean 
that the accused will have a valid defence only where information 
was received concerning the legality of the action it was intended
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to undertake. This information should be objective and reliable. 
Such information can normally be secured by seeking advice
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from those who are in charge of enforcing the law, e.g. courts of 
law and civil services. A spontaneous mistake, therefore, should 
not usually be considered as sufficient.
Spontaneous mistake
To avoid making a mistake of law, it is necessary to know the 
law. It has been decided that many basic rules, e.g. the
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prohibition of carrying a flick-knife (CA Grenoble, 13 
November 1996), are considered to be part of elementary civic 
awareness, of which no-one can be unaware). Fortunately for 
lawyers   and unfortunately for laymen   understanding the law 
is not always easy. The uninitiated citizen must sometimes be 
resigned to referring to a competent authority for advice. This 
should be done whenever an act is contemplated and he or she 
is not absolutely clear whether that act is lawful. If it is not done, 
the citizen will be at fault and, should the case arise, will be 
blamed for this spontaneous mistake. Whether or not he or she 
has legal knowledge does not alter matters if he or she 
misunderstands the law. What matters is that a mere citizen, 
whatever his or her legal skill might be, has no official authority 
to state the law. This is why his or her mistake cannot be 
regarded as an excuse. For example, a foreign driver cannot 
pretend that he does not know the speed limits in France (CA 
Douai, 26 October 1994); another court of appeal, however, 
decided that a director was not guilty for failing to refer to the 
company's work's council when he was required to do so, just 
because the law was not absolutely clear and could create 
uncertainties (CA Reims, 1 April 1994).
Two particular instances of spontaneous mistake should, 
however, be considered separately. In the first case, if it is 
accepted that one should seek advice if the lawfulness of an act 
is even only slightly uncertain, what happens if a law changes a 
rule that had always been accepted in everyday life? The offender 
will nevertheless probably be guilty of not having known about 
the change. These legal changes which affect everyday life
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nowadays receive huge coverage through the media. People who 
are genuinely unaware of these new rules, because they live like 
hermits, can still be considered at fault, for they cannot spurn 
with impunity the society that exists around them and to which 
they nevertheless belong.
The second case is that of a person who would like to enquire 
about the lawfulness of an act, but who is unable to do so (for 
instance, because they live in a remote village cut off from the
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surrounding world due to poor weather conditions). That 
person should, as far as possible, refrain from acting until more 
information can be received. But if it were necessary to act 
quickly and such a person thereby committed an offence, 
necessity, rather than mistake of law, could be used as a defence.
AN ABSOLUTE BELIEF
Absolute faith in the lawfulness of the act has to be demonstrated. 
Proving a state of mind is, of course, impossible. It therefore has to 
be inferred from evidence which shows that the offender had, prior 
to the act, gathered all the necessary information to bring about a 
reasonable belief that the act was legal.O
Incorrect information
If it is necessary to think twice and, when in doubt, to seek 
advice before acting, it is useful to know where to apply. Lawyers 
such as advocates, legal advisers working in big firms and
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academics are meant to give advice to citizens as to their legal 
rights and duties, either directly or through the various books 
and articles they publish. But while their job is to teach or 
counsel, their duty is not to see to the law's proper enforcement. 
Furthermore, their opinion can always be regarded as subjective; 
often what one considers legal another may label an offence. If 
their advice were to be considered as a valid origin for a mistake 
of law, it would just be a matter of selecting that advice which 
most closely reflected the intended action. In fact, many 
professionals would agree, for a substantial fee, to testify that 
they told their client that his/her plans were lawful. Nevertheless, 
courts of appeal have accepted the defence of mistaken advice 
given by a lawyer; for instance in the case of a divorced father 
who had gone to see his children although not entitled to meet 
them (CA Douai, 26 September 1996). On the other hand, a 
divorced man who had entered his former house, which had 
been granted to his ex-wife, was found guilty although his lawyer 
had told him he was also entitled to use it (Cass Crim, 1 1 
October 1995).
Public authorities in the field to which the inquiry relates are 
traditionally considered as having authority to supply legal 
consultations to citizens. As they are responsible for the 
enforcement of law in their field of competence, they can 
legitimately inform a citizen confronted with legal queries in this 
field. Competent public authorities alone enjoy a legitimacy and 
a presumption of objectivity sufficient to provide legal 
information which citizens need not question. If the accused has
followed such advice, although it was wrong, courts should 
nevertheless decide that there is a defence, because the mistake 
of law committed could not have been avoided.
Unstable law
Another authority, regarded as even more able to compel 
observance of the law, is the judiciary. But it is not part of a 
court's duty to act in an advisory capacity. In fact, a court's 
opinion can only be ascertained through its decisions and 
citizens should be able to rely on this case-law.
It is, of course, necessary to model one's behaviour on the 
obvious meaning of a line of precedent. Taking the liberty of 
making an analogy should be considered as negligent. The line 
of precedent should in any case be clear, consistent and emanate 
from sufficientlv high-ranking courts. But if these conditions
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were fulfilled, and the accused's behaviour conformed to the law 
as set by such precedent, the accused should thereby not be 
deemed guilty, since it appeared that he/she would be acting 
legitimately.
The law of precedent is not as strong in French as in English 
law: the Cour de Cassation itself sometimes suddenly decides to 
change the law by putting an end to a long string of precedents. 
These changes, although often understandable from a social
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point of view (such as the decision in 1992 that a husband can 
be considered to have raped his wife), are legally inequitable. 
This is why a mistake of law that originates in a firm line of 
precedent deserves the protection of art. 122-3. On the other 
hand, where an offender was reckless as to the legality of his/her 
acts, or knew that he/she was committing an offence, the fact 
that other people thought that offender to be acting legally is 
irrelevant.
A MISTAKEN BELIEF
To establish that he/she is not guilty of what is materially an 
offence, the offender has to:
'prove that /ie[/she] believed .. . that he[/she] could lawfully 
accomplish the act.' (art. 122-3)
This defence is thus based on a (mistaken) belief and this belief 
will have to be proved.
An absolute belief
Absolute faith in the lawfulness of the act has to be 
demonstrated. Proving a state of mind is, of course, impossible. 
It therefore has to be inferred from evidence which shows that 
the offender had, prior to the act, gathered all the necessary 
information to bring about a reasonable belief that the act was 
legal. But, as long as the offender legitimately believed in this 
legality, that offender could not be said to have had mem rea.
Regardless of whether the average good citizen would also 
have believed that such behaviour was legal, the judge shouldO ' Jo
make an in concrete assessment. However, it will seldom be done, 
for it would not make sense. Where it appears that the origin of 
the belief was legitimate, this should be such that anyone would 
have believed it to be genuine. Otherwise it would be necessary 
to assume that a person concerned about the lawfulness of some 
act requested information from a high ranking authority and 
that, although the answer was that the act was indeed legal, that 
person still remained doubtful. That person should then be
considered as having mens rea, for there is no requirement to give 
evidence of an authority's belief, but only of the offender's own 
belief. Other than in these circumstances, the offender should 
not be found guilty of having believed information from a source 
sufficiently legitimate to be trusted by anyone.
Proof of the belief
Nevertheless, this will have to be proved. The onus of proof 
indeed rests on the defendant. Of course, a defendant is 
presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. The prosecution 
must therefore 'prove all the elements of the offence as well as 
the lack of any element likely to make it disappear'. The public 
prosecution department should show evidence of actus reus and 
of mens rea. Of course, proving that the offender infringed what 
that offender knew was a legal rule is almost impossible. This is 
where the presumption of knowledge of the law comes in: it 
spares the prosecution the trouble of finding incorporeal 
evidence.
Since art. 122-3 was created, it has become a rebuttable 
presumption. The prosecution need not prove that the offender 
knew the provision infringed (the presumption remains) but the 
offender can prove the contrary (only as a rebuttable 
presumption). ''Reus in excipiendo Jit actor' applies here. Article 
122-3 is in any case absolutely clear concerning this problem 
and confirms the above demonstration. On the other hand, the 
provision is rather vague as to the consequences of the mistake 
of law.
DOUBTS OVER 'OMISSION'
Statutes traditionally make it an offence to do something, hut 
nowadays Parliament frequently makes it an offence to omit to do 
something. Article 122-3 can obviously apply in the first case. It is 
indeed meant to protect people who believed that they could 
'accomplish the act'. But this wording is precisely what might sow 
doubt on the use of this provision when dealing with offences of 
omission: one can well wonder whether it applies to cases in which 
offenders mistakenly believed they could lawfully refrain from acting.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISTAKE
The wording of art. 122-3 is very comprehensive as far as the 
consequences of the mistake are concerned. It is, however, not 
certain that all offenders having committed a mistake will be
O
found not guilty, even though their mistake was of the requisite 
kind. Defences apply differently, depending on the type of 
offence and on the part the offender played in the offence.
TYPES OF OFFENCE
Many classifications of offences exist in France. They are 
based on either ideological or technical criteria. Only those that 
are likely to have some relevance with regard to art. 122-3 will 
be mentioned here.
Serious and minor offences
The main classification reflects the seriousness of the various 
offences. It comprises three levels: crimes, delits and contraventions. 
It entails procedural consequences and also commands different 
rules within criminal law itself. Crimes necessarily imply 
intention. Delits, normally intentional, can, if the law so 
provides, stem from negligence or recklessness. Mens rea being 27
therefore part of the definition of these offences, art. 122-3 can 
apply here as a defence, for its purpose is to negate mem rea. 
Contraventions, on the other hand, are usually considered as 
offences of strict liability and courts have decided that, in such a 
case, 'material evidence of the act' is sufficient to find the 
offender criminally liable, irrespective of the proof of intention 
or negligence. It is however submitted that some moral wrong is 
always necessary to find a person guilty of an offence, including 
a contravention. Penalty loses its meaning if no moral wrong was 
committed (nulla poena sine culpa). If a (specific) mens rea is 
therefore also part of contraventions, then art. 122-3 should 
possibly apply here too.
Action and omission
Statutes traditionally make it an offence to do something, but 
nowadays Parliament frequently makes it an offence to omit to 
do something. Article 122-3 can obviously apply in the first 
case. It is indeed meant to protect people who believed that they 
could 'accomplish the act'. But this wording is precisely what 
might sow doubt on the use of this provision when dealing with 
offences of omission: one can well wonder whether it applies to 
cases in which offenders mistakenly believed they could lawfully 
refrain from acting.
Although art. 122-3 aims explicitly at active behaviour, a wide 
construction appears reasonable: such an interpretation is 
possible for provisions which operate as defences (injavorem). 
The offenders' impunity depends on their belief in the 
lawfulness of their behaviour; thus, whether the behaviour was 
active or passive does not matter.
Intention, recklessness and negligence
It goes without saying that the defence applies to offences that 
require intention as mens rea. In French law, intention means that 
offenders want to obtain a result that they know is illegal. But if 
they think that they can legitimately behave in such a way, it is 
because they do not know that it is illegal. If intention is lacking 
the act cannot be labelled an offence. All intentional offences are 
consequently likely to be struck down by a mistake of law.
Its use with other kinds of offences is more problematic. In 
such cases, offenders wilfully act in a given way, but without 
seeking what will be the outcome of their behaviour, either 
because they are reckless as to the outcome, or because they 
simply did not consider it. It is submitted that art. 122-3 is 
operative here too. To remain in the field of legality, an act can 
entail all sorts of consequences, as long as it does not infringe 
values protected by criminal law. This is where mistake of law 
can creep in. An individual might be unaware, because of a 
mistake of law, that a specific value is protected by law. That 
individual cannot be guilty of not having foreseen the 
consequences of his/her actions as regards such a value if he/she 
was not able to know that it enjoyed the protection of criminal 
law. When, because of an insuperable mistake of law, all the 
possible consequences of an act appeared legal to a person, that 
person is not guilty of not having taken precautions to avoid 
these consequences. This is why mistake of law should be 
accepted as a defence when faced with offences involving 
recklessness or negligence.
The wide range given to this defence is reassuring for the law- 
abiding citizen commiting an offence in spite of a desire to
respect the law. The citizen's behaviour nevertheless is harmful 
and it is therefore necessary to punish those participants in the 
offence who may not be so easily excused.
PARTICIPANTS IN THE OFFENCE
Several people are often connected with the same crime. 
Their degree of involvement may vary and deciding who can 
actually be considered as an offender is not always 
straightforward. Depending on their role, they will be described 
as a principal or accomplice.
Principals
Sometimes there is more than one principal involved in the 
crime. However, to be considered as such, each one must have 
committed all the legal components of the offence: actus reus and 
mens rea. A defence such as mistake of law proceeds from 
individual idiosyncrasy. Therefore, it does not follow that 
because one of the principals can benefit from this defence, the 
others can too. If several people have participated in a crime, 
while only some of them believed, because of an insuperable 
mistake, that they could lawfully accomplish the act, only the 
latter will be excused.
Accomplices
French law, much as the common law of hpmicide used to, 
distinguishes between justification and excuse. Using this 
terminology, mistake of law would be considered as an excuse. 
The distinction notably affects the status of accomplices. If the 
offence is justified, it disappears erga omnes. But if it is excused, 
the excuse applies only to the accused whose personal 
circumstances (infancy, insanity or mistake) provide a specific 
excuse. The defence of art. 122-3 will hence not necessarily 
apply to the accomplice as well, unless the accomplice too can 
prove that he/she believed, because of an insuperable mistake of 
law, that the act was lawful. On the other hand, and subject to 
the same conditions, an accomplice can benefit from the 
defence, while the principal cannot.
ERRARE HUMANUM EST
The new defence created by the French Parliament in 1992 
has an extremely wide scope as regards the offences likely to be 
excused, as well as the participants in the offence. Fortunately, 
the conditions required for a mistake of law to be accepted as a 
valid defence are extremely restrictive. If it were to be accepted 
too easily, it would turn bad faith into a defence. Considering 
the Cour de Cassation's position, the risk is rather, for the time 
being, that art. 122-3 might become a dead letter. ®
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